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INCREASED RISK OF DISEASE DAMAGES: 
PROPORTIONAL RECOVERY AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO THE ALL OR NOTHING SYSTEM EXEMPLIFIED 
BY ASBESTOS CASES 
Deirdre A. McDonnell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional common law tort rules are often inadequate for handling 
the unique problems that arise when exposure to a hazardous sub-
stance allegedly causes an injury.! Unlike conventional injury claims, 
toxic tort2 claims often involve an increased risk that persists even 
after the tortious conduct has ceased.3 For example, in a traditional 
case, a driver might create an increased risk by driving a car with 
brakes that he or she knows are not functioning. Although the act of 
driving recklessly creates a risk to other drivers and pedestrians, the 
driver will be liable only if he or she actually causes damage to 
another.4 In other words, the conduct only becomes tortious when it 
results in immediate injury to others; once the risk created by the 
carelessness ends, the possibility of liability in tort ceases. If the 
driver reaches his or her destination safely, the level of risk returns 
to normal and there is no liability.5 In contrast, when a chemical 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1996-1997. 
1 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987). 
2 Toxic torts can be defined as civil actions alleging a right of recovery for damages that arose 
from exposure to a chemical substance, emission, or product, where that exposure allegedly 
caused physical and/or psychological harm. JAMES T. O'REILLY, ToXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE 
§ 2.01 (2d ed. 1992). 
3 Barton C. Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 
563, 566 (1984). 
4 See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION § 4.1, at 107 (2d ed. 1993). 
5 See Legum, supra note 3, at 564-65. 
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company mishandles a toxic substance, exposing neighbors to the 
toxin, it creates an increased risk that continues long after the com-
pany has stopped acting carelessly.6 
A victim of an involuntary toxic exposure often will have present 
injuries in the form of adverse health consequences or property dam-
age, but also may have an increased risk of serious disease, such as 
cancer.7 Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases frequently include claims for 
increased risk of future disease.8 In fact, if plaintiffs wait to see if a 
disease actually develops, they may lose the right to bring a claim at 
all.9 In many jurisdictions, legal rules, such as statutes of limitations, 
statutes of repose, and the single cause of action rule, preclude a 
second suit for damages caused by a later developing disease.lO 
The legal standard that most courts apply to claims for increased 
risk of disease makes recovering damages for increased risk nearly 
impossible when the plaintiff is a victim of a toxic exposure.l1 Most 
courts allow recovery for increased risk of disease only when a plain-
tiff has both a present injury and an increased risk which makes the 
plaintiff more likely than not to develop the latent disease eventu-
ally.12 If the plaintiff meets the requirements of the standard, courts 
allow that plaintiff to recover full damages as though he or she cur-
rently was afflicted with the disease.13 Thus, the plaintiff is allowed to 
recover present damages for all probable future consequences. 
6 See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, THE ASBESTOS HAZARD 19 (1980) (mesothelioma usually occurs 
twenty to fifty years after exposure). 
7 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Jackson 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 410-11 (5th Cir.), cm. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); 
Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987); Kosmacek v. Farm Service Co-op of Persia, 
485 N.W.2d 99, 101, 104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). 
8 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 410 (seeking damages for increased risk of cancer); Gideon v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1985) (seeking damages for increased 
risk of cancer). 
9 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
10 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
11 See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1986); Dartez v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985), appeal after remand, 910 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 
1990), and cm. denied, 504 U.S. 935 (1992); Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 
1516, 1524 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
12 See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, recons. denied, en banc, 
797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff must show cancer more likely than not); Gideon, 761 F.2d 
at 1137 (likelihood of developing cancer must be proven by preponderance of evidence); Ander-
son v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass.), later proceeding sub nom, Anderson 
v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986), later proceeding, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988), aff'd 
sub nom, Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir.), and cm. denied, 498 U.S. 891 
(1990) (plaintiffs must show reasonable probability that future illness will occur). 
13 Jackson, 781 F.2d at 412; Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cm. 
denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
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Although toxic tort plaintiffs often face an increased risk of disease, 
they usually are not compensated for their increased risk because 
they are unable to meet the requirements of the current standard.14 
The only reported cases where victims of toxic exposures successfully 
have recovered damages for increased risk of disease involved occu-
pational exposure to asbestos.15 Limiting recovery for increased risk 
of disease caused by toxic exposure to asbestos highlights both the 
unique etiology of asbestos-related diseases and the atypical history 
of asbestos litigation. Moreover, the asbestos cases illustrate the un-
easy fit between the traditional legal standard and the problems 
presented by environmental exposures.16 
Although most toxic tort plaintiffs are undercompensated because 
they do not receive damages for their increased risk, asbestos plain-
tiffs have been overcompensated because they have been compen-
sated fully for diseases they may never develop. The anomalous re-
sults created when courts apply the increased risk standard to toxic 
tort cases fail to further the goals of the tort system. Awarding full 
damages to plaintiffs who are more likely than not to suffer from a 
disease in the future, while denying damages to plaintiffs who have a 
significantly increased risk that falls below fifty percent, does not 
provide appropriate compensation or an appropriate level of deter-
rence because the current system invariably overcompensates or un-
dercompensates plaintiffs. 
Courts have designed the present standard to prevent plaintiffs 
from recovering based on speculative claims.17 Courts have concluded 
that allowing damages for increased risks that are not probable would 
lead to a flood of speculative suits. IS 
Although the current standard furthers the goal of discouraging 
speCUlative suits, it is not necessarily consistent with the goals of the 
tort system. The twin goals of the tort system are to compensate 
victims and to deter careless or reckless behavior.19 To achieve these 
goals, compensation must be sufficient to make the victim whole with-
14 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Hagerty, 788 
F.2d at 320. 
15 Jackson, 781 F.2d at 413; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138. 
16 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 299 (N.J. 1987) (discussing treatment of toxic tort 
cases by courts). 
17 See, e.g., Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 A.2d 257, 266 (N.J. 1989). 
18 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307; Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). 
19 See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 4, at 25 
(5th ed. 1984). 
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out forcing the defendant to pay for damages that his or her behavior 
did not cause. 
The unique nature of asbestos injuries and asbestos litigation cre-
ates an irony. Although in many toxic tort cases there is no recovery, 
and therefore no deterrent effect, in asbestos cases plaintiffs have 
been particularly successful.20 Overcompensating asbestos plaintiffs 
by allowing full recovery for increased risk of disease is particularly 
unjust because these awards come on the heels of numerous awards 
of compensatory and punitive damages that already have depleted the 
resources of asbestos manufacturers.21 Forcing asbestos manufactur-
ers to pay for more damages than they actually have caused under-
mines the goals of the tort system because it may make damages 
unavailable for future plaintiffs injured through asbestos exposure.22 
In addition to depleting the funds available to future plaintiffs, allow-
ing full compensation for increased risk of disease caused by asbestos 
exposure does not provide the correct level of deterrence because it 
forces defendants to pay for more than the damage for which they are 
actually responsible.23 
The goals of the tort system are not met in any increased risk of 
disease case. Because the current standard allows full recovery when 
the plaintiff shows a greater than fifty percent chance that the future 
disease will occur, the current standard may overcompensate plain-
tiffs who do recover. Plaintiffs who recover increased risk of disease 
damages are compensated as though they have the actual disease, 
when, in reality, there may be a forty-nine percent chance that they 
will never develop the disease. In the asbestos cases, the plaintiffs 
were overcompensated because they collected damages for diseases 
they may never get.24 However, in most cases involving toxic exposures 
there is no compensation for increased risk and therefore no deterrent.25 
20 Compare Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) (precluding 
plaintiffs from recovery for increased risk) and Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 
315,319 (5th Cir. 1986) (same) with Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (allowing recovery for increased risk) and Gideon v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985) (same). 
21 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings before the Subcomm. 
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
l02d Cong., 1st and 2d Sessions 8 (1991-92) [hereinafter Asbestos Litigation Crisis]. 
'l2.Id. 
23 Allowing plaintiffs who have a 51% chance of getting cancer to recover as though they 
already have cancer means that some plaintiffs will receive full compensation but will never 
actually get the disease. 
24 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 413; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138. 
25 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Hagerty v. L 
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Courts could resolve the problems of overcompensation and under-
compensation by adopting a system of proportional recovery.26 Allow-
ing plaintiffs with present injuries and significantly increased risk of 
future disease to recover damages proportional to their increase in 
risk would eliminate the problems inherent in the current approach. 
In asbestos cases this solution would avoid depleting the limited funds 
available by not overcompensating claimants with an increased risk 
of disease. In cases involving other toxic substances, proportional 
recovery could be available for plaintiffs who have a significantly 
increased risk of disease, but whose chances of getting the disease are 
less than fifty percent. 
This Comment explores the reasons for the different treatment of 
asbestos cases. It also uses the asbestos cases to highlight some 
problems with the present approach to increased risk of disease dam-
ages and suggests an alternative that would mitigate some of these 
problems. Section II examines the development of the present stand-
ard for increased risk of disease damages and how courts have applied 
the standard to toxic tort claims. Section III compares the different 
results achieved by asbestos plaintiffs to results obtained by other 
toxic tort plaintiffs. Section IV concludes by suggesting a proportional 
system to ameliorate the problems of overcompensation and under-
compensation inherent in the current system. 
II. DAMAGES FOR INCREASED RISK 
A. Traditional Standard 
Damages for increased risk of disease or injury are not new.27 Courts 
have recognized claims for increased risk in traditional tort suits 
& L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 
F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986). 
26 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 263-69 (1987). In many jurisdictions courts have fashioned a proportional system of 
recovery in the area of medical malpractice. See, e.g., Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 
589,592 (Nev. 1991). These courts allow recovery in cases where a patient was treated negli-
gently by a health care provider but had a preexisting condition that likely would have caused 
the patient's death even absent the malpractice. [d. In these so-called "loss of chance" cases 
many courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover proportional damages based on the chance of 
survival that they had. [d. This type of recovery, however, has been rejected explicitly in the 
toxic tort context. Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F. Supp. 424, 427 (D.S.C. 1987). 
27 See, e.g., Feist v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 680 (Or. 1973); Pullen v. Boston 
Elevated R.R. Co., 94 N.E. 469, 469 (Mass. 1911); Strohm v. The N.Y. L.E. & W. R.R., 96 N.Y. 
305, 306 (1884). 
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involving traumatic injuries since the nineteenth century.28 Cases in-
volving both a present injury and an increased likelihood of a future 
disease or injury present a problem for the plaintiff because the rules 
of res judicata usually limit an injured party to one recovery.29 Many 
courts have responded to this situation by allowing recovery for fu-
ture consequences if a plaintiff can show that the future condition is 
sufficiently likely to occur.30 
In traditional tort cases, increased risk damages are claimed when 
the plaintiff has a catastrophic injury that also makes a future condi-
tion more likely to occur.31 For instance, in Feist v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., a falling cash register fractured a child's skull.32 The plaintiff's 
expert testified that, due to the skull fracture, the child would be 
susceptible to contracting meningitis in the future.33 The Feist court 
held that it was proper for the jury in this case "to consider the 
evidence that plaintiff has a susceptibility for such future problem."34 
Thus, courts traditionally have held that "[a] plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation for all damages that reasonably are to be expected to 
follow ... the injury."35 
However, to prevent plaintiffs from recovering based on specula-
tive damages, courts impose a threshold standard for increased risk 
recovery.36 Courts often describe the level of increased risk necessary 
as a prerequisite to recovery as "reasonable medical certainty" or 
"reasonable probability."37 Courts employ these standards to prevent 
plaintiffs from recovering based on speculative claims.38 
28 See, e.g., Strohm, 96 N.Y. at 306. 
29 See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985); Pertiello 
v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 483 (Conn. 1990); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. 1967). 
30 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988); Herber v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 
F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138; Pertiello, 576 A.2d at 482. 
31 See, e.g., Feist, 517 P.2d at 675; Strohm, 96 N.Y. at 306. 
32 Feist, 516 P.2d at 675. 
33 [d. at 680. 
34 [d. 
35 Pullen v. Boston Elevated R.R. Co., 94 N.E. 469, 469 (Mass. 1911). 
36 See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319, reeons. denied, en bane, 797 
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985). 
37 Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1201; Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F. Supp. 424, 426 (D.S.C. 1987). 
38 See Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Mass. 1986); Ayers v. Jackson 
Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 306 (N.J. 1987); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.1985). 
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Despite the apparent difference between "certainty" and "prob-
ability," many courts use the terms interchangeably to allow recovery 
where the chances of contracting a disease are greater than fifty 
percent or more likely than not.39 A plaintiff recovers damages as 
though he or she were afflicted with the disease if the plaintiff can 
establish that he or she has a greater than fifty percent chance of 
developing the disease.4o This is an "all or nothing" approach, since 
the plaintiff either receives full compensation for the future disease 
or is barred from any recovery.41 
While claims for increased risk of future consequences are uncom-
mon in traditional tort cases, in toxic tort cases, plaintiffs often face 
an increased risk of disease. 
B. Toxic Torts and Increased Risk 
Claims arising from environmental exposures often differ from tra-
ditional negligence claims in that the negligent behavior and the 
injury are not contemporaneous in toxic tort cases.42 Traditional tort 
rules assume that the defendant's act and the injury usually take place 
simultaneously.43 Statutes oflimitations and rules prohibiting splitting 
causes of action do not adequately take into account injuries that 
induce diseases with long latency periods.44 For these reasons, toxic 
tort plaintiffs often include claims for increased risk of disease with 
their other tort claims.45 
1. Statutes of Limitations 
Statutes of limitations,46 which bar all suits for personal injuries 
after a specified period of time-typically two to three years-pose a 
39 See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1201; Rabb, 677 F. Supp. at 426. 
40 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 413; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1138. 
41 John C. Cummings, Note, How Far Should Increased Risk Recovery Be Carried in the 
Context of Exposure to Hazardous Substances, 76 KEN. L. J. 459, 461 (1987-88). 
42 See Legum, supra note 3, at 566. 
43 Id. at 564. 
44 See David P.C. Ashton, Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for Increased 
Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1081, 1086 (1989). 
45 See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 80 (3d Cir. 1986); Pollock v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 489 (D.N.J. 1988); Anderson v. w.R. Grace & Co., 
628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D. 
Colo. 1984); Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987). 
46 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 260, § 2A (1992). 
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potential block to suits involving diseases that develop long after a 
tortious act occurs.47 Traditionally, statutes of limitations began to run 
at the time of the careless or reckless action, or the breach of duty of 
care.48 In a toxic tort case this event occurs when the defendant 
mishandles a toxic substance, allowing someone to be exposed to a 
toxin. 
Many jurisdictions have ameliorated the harsh effect of their stat-
utes of limitations by adopting the discovery rule.49 The discovery rule 
provides that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff is 
able to discover his or her injury.5o In a jurisdiction that uses the 
discovery rule, a plaintiff who discovers that he or she has cancer 
twenty years after working with hazardous chemicals still has two or 
three years (the amount of time provided in the applicable statute of 
limitations) to bring suitY However, because some jurisdictions have 
not adopted the discovery rule, statutes of limitation still may bar 
recovery for diseases with long latency periods.52 Even in jurisdictions 
that adopt the discovery rule, a plaintiff with a present injury and a 
latent disease may face a choice between bringing a cause of action 
for the present injury, or waiting to bring a claim for the future 
disease and thereby finding the claim for the original injury barred. 
2. Single Cause of Action Rule 
Grounded in the doctrine of res judicata,53 the single cause of action 
rule, also called claim preclusion, provides that a single wrongful act 
can give rise to only one action.54 When a plaintiff fails to include an 
item of damage or a ground of recovery in a single cause of action, he 
or she may not claim the omitted element later. 55 If a plaintiff prevails 
47 Cummings, supra note 41, at 464. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 465; see, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), 
review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989). 
50 Cummings, supra note 41, at 464. 
51 See id. 
52 See Fournier J. Gale III & James L. Goyer III, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased 
Risk of Cancer, 15 CUMBo L. REV. 723, 739 n.95 (1985). 
53 Res judicata is a common law doctrine that provides that an existing final judgment on the 
merits is conclusive of rights and facts in issue. Res judicata stands for claim or cause of action 
preclusion. WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: ToOLS FOR 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS 1 (1988). 
54 See Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing 
Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1989, 1989 (1990). 
55 FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7, at 541 (2d ed. 
1977). 
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on a cause of action, any other potential claims merge into that judg-
ment.56 The claim preclusion rule, which requires a plaintiff to include 
all claims in a single suit, prevents the plaintiff from harassing the 
defendant with multiple suits, promotes finality, and avoids inconsis-
tent judgments.57 Claim preclusion creates a dilemma for plaintiffs 
with a present injury and an increased risk of disease because, if the 
plaintiff brings an action for the existing injury, the claim preclusion 
rule will bar a later claim if the disease does develop. 58 
Some courts59 have created an exception to the claim preclusion rule 
to allow second suits for a separate disease that was not present at 
the time of the initial action.60 In Ayers v. Jackson Township, for 
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, 
whom the defendant had exposed to contaminated drinking water, 
could not recover for their increased risk of disease, but would be 
allowed to bring another cause of action for the contamination if they 
later developed a disease, such as cancer.61 
Many jurisdictions, however, still preclude second suits arising from 
the same exposure.62 In these states, plaintiffs may not sue for their 
present injuries and then bring a second suit if a disease later strikes.63 
Although some federal courts have expressed dissatisfaction with the 
single cause of action rule, they feel bound to apply it.64 In Hagerty v. 
L & L Marine Services, for instance, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed its dissatisfaction with the 
single cause of action rule stating: "The victim of exposure to toxic 
substances which cause present harm and which may at some future 
56 Id. at 539-40. 
57 See Frier v. City of Vandalia, 770 F.2d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1985); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. 
Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
58 See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 316 (5th Cir. 1986); Jackson v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985); Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 
586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984). 
59 Currently, fourteen jurisdictions allow second suits for later developing diseases. See As-
bestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 46(4)1. 
60 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.T. 1987); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 
P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989). 
61 Ayers, 525 A.2d at 300. 
62 See, e.g., Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 316 (applying Texas law); Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411 (applying 
Mississippi law); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1136 (applying Texas law); Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 18 
(applying Colorado law). In his testimony to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Professor 
Lester Brickman reported that fourteen jurisdictions allow second suits while seven do not. 
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 460-61 (letter from Professor Brickman). There 
are twenty-four jurisdictions in which the issue is unclear or unresolved. Id. 
63 See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 320; Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1136. 
64 See Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 317. 
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time cause cancer or other serious disease is further victimized by the 
single cause of action rule."65 
3. Application of the Increased Risk of Disease Standard to Toxic 
Tort Plaintiffs 
Although awarding damages for increased risk of disease seems 
appropriate compensation for victims of toxic torts who have a pre-
sent injury and an increased risk of future disease, plaintiffs generally 
have not been successful with claims for increased risk.66 The "more 
likely than not" standard has precluded nearly all claims for increased 
risk of disease caused by toxic exposures.67 
Most toxic tort plaintiffs are precluded from recovery under the 
"more likely than not" standard because, although they have a sig-
nificantly increased risk of acquiring a disease such as cancer, the 
probability of the plaintiff actually developing the disease usually is 
less than fifty percent.68 For instance, if a particular disease could 
normally be expected to occur in four out of every 10,000 people, and 
an individual, as a result of a toxic exposure had his or her risk 
increased 100 times, that individual would, nonetheless, be unable to 
recover under the "more likely than not" standard because that plain-
tiff's risk of getting the disease would be only forty percent. Thus, the 
plaintiff in Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp. could not recover damages for 
increased risk of disease because his expert witness testified that his 
risk of lung cancer "was only 'approaching fifty percent."'69 
Moreover, plaintiffs typically have great difficulty meeting the bur-
den of proof in tort actions based on exposures to hazardous sub-
stances.70 This problem arises from the relationship between environ-
mental exposures and disease and the difficulty of using scientific 
evidence.71 Although courts often require that plaintiffs quantify a 
risk to meet the requisite standard, expert witnesses are often not 
able or willing to assign a precise number to the plaintiff's increased 
risk of disease.72 Even when the plaintiff's increased risk is quan-
65 See id. at 320. 
66 See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 458, 466 (5th Cir. 1985); Anderson, 628 
F. Supp. at 1232; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308. 
67 See Dartez, 765 F.2d at 466; Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308. 
68 See, e.g., Dartez, 765 F.2d at 466; Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308. 
69 Dartez, 765 F.2d at 466. 
70 O'REILLY, supra note 2, § 15.01. 
71 See id. 
72 See Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
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tifiable, the likelihood that the plaintiff actually will develop the dis-
ease often falls short of the fifty percent threshold, causing courts to 
deny most claims for increased risk of disease caused by toxic expo-
sure.73 
Recovering damages for increased risk of disease is so difficult, in 
fact, that there are only two reported toxic tort cases in which the 
plaintiffs successfully recovered damages based on increased risk of 
disease.74 Both of these cases arose because the plaintiffs claimed 
damages based on their exposure to asbestos.75 Thus, asbestos expo-
sure is unique among toxic torts. The following section discusses the 
particular aspects of asbestos that have enabled asbestos plaintiffs to 
recover successfully for increased risk of disease. 
III. ASBESTOS-THE EXCEPTION TO INSUFFICIENT RECOVERY 
FOR INCREASED RISK IN TOXIC TORT CASES 
The fact that the only plaintiffs to recover increased risk of disease 
damages were individuals who worked with asbestos suggests the 
profound differences between asbestos litigation and litigation based 
on other toxic exposures.76 Asbestos litigation is highly unusual both 
because plaintiffs have been successful and because scientific evidence 
has linked unique diseases to asbestos exposure. The unusual histo-
ries of asbestos and asbestos litigation in the United States help 
explain why asbestos plaintiffs have successfully recovered damages 
for increased risk of disease while victims of other toxic exposures 
have not. 
A. Histories of Asbestos and Asbestos Litigation 
Asbestos is a generic term for a number of fibrous minerals that 
have been widely prized for their versatility and non-combustibility.77 
Although people have used asbestos since prehistoric times, the mod-
ern asbestos industry started in the 1870s, and use of asbestos grew 
73 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) (increased risk 
of 25-30% not sufficient to meet standard); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 
1231 (D. Mass. 1986) (plaintiffs did not quantify increased risk); Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 
287,303 (N.J. 1987) (doctor could not quantify enhanced risk). 
74 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. lO22 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985). 
75 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 369; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
76 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 369; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
77 BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 5. 
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rapidly after that time.78 By the 1970s, Americans were using an 
average of 800,000 tons of asbestos per year.79 
Asbestos fibers easily break down and become airborne, allowing 
workers to inhale the fibers.80 Once inhaled, asbestos becomes imbed-
ded in the lungs where it can remain for a lifetime and potentially can 
lead to a variety of diseases including cancer.81 As many as thirty to 
forty percent of workers heavily exposed to asbestos will die of cancer 
eventually.82 
The dangers of asbestos exposure were not just recently discov-
ered. People were aware of the dangers of asbestos centuries ago.83 
The ancient Roman historian Pliny documented the use of bladder 
skins as respirators to protect slaves who wove asbestos.84 Modern 
investigators began to accumulate knowledge about the dangers of 
asbestos as asbestos use rapidly increased in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.86 In 1897, a Vienna physician wrote of as-
bestos workers who suffered pulmonary problems as a result of breath-
ing asbestos dust.86 During this period, a British pathologist, W. E. 
Cooke, published a detailed case report of a thirty-three year old 
patient who had died after working in an asbestos factory for twenty 
years.87 In his paper, Dr. Cooke named the disease that afflicted the 
young woman "pulmonary asbestosis."88 
Although English scientists conducted much of the earliest re-
search on asbestos-related disease, scientists in the United States 
began to explore asbestos-related disease in the 1930s.89 The Journal 
of the American Medical Association published case reports and 
reviews of literature on asbestosis in 1930.90 After 1930, the medical 
78 BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 2 (1984). 
79 BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 5. 
80 [d. at 8. 
81 [d.; Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 277, 
286 (1996). 
82 BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 1. 
83 Note, Predicting the Future: Present Mental Anguish for Fear of Developing Cancer in 
the Future as a Result of Past Asbestos Exposure, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1993). 
84 CASTLEMAN, supra note 78, at 1. 
85 [d. at 2-7. 
86 [d. at 2. 
87 [d. at 7. 
88 [d. 
89 CASTLEMAN, supra note 78, at 16--17. 
90 [d. at 16. 
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literature on asbestosis began to groW.91 By 1935, experts in the 
United States widely recognized asbestosis as a serious threat.92 
Not long after the medical community identified asbestosis, the 
carcinogenicity of asbestos began to be uncovered.93 During the 1940s, 
experts noted the link between asbestos and cancer in reviews in the 
fields of industrial medicine and cancer research.94 
Although people in the asbestos industry were aware of the risks 
of asbestos, corporate leaders took affirmative steps to suppress in-
formation about the health effects of asbestos.95 This practice eventu-
ally culminated in large awards of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages to exposed workers based on claims that asbestos was a defective 
product because manufacturers failed to warn workers of the dan-
gers.96 
Between eleven and twenty million American workers have asbes-
tos exposures at levels sufficient to lead to asbestos-related health 
problems.97 Exposed workers have brought tens of thousands of cases 
against asbestos companies prompting at least fourteen large corpo-
rations to file for bankruptcy protection.98 In 1990, more than 33,000 
cases were pending in federal courts and an estimated 60,000 more 
cases were pending in state courts.99 
There are several physical manifestations of asbestos exposure. For 
example, scarring of the lung's lining called pleural plaques is a com-
mon occurrence in individuals who have been exposed to asbestos.lOo 
Pleural plaques can be identified by x-ray and are often the first 
physical change apparent when someone has been exposed to asbes-
tOS.10l Although pleural plaques suggest heavy asbestos exposure, 
they do not cause impairment of lung capacity or function. lo2 
91 [d. at 22. 
92 [d. at 31. 
93 [d. at 37. 
94 CASTLEMAN, supra note 78, at 37. 
95 PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 16 (1985). 
96 See id. at 183. 
97 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 2; Jerry J. Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: 
The Test of the 1brt System, 36 ARK. L. REV. 343, 343 (1982). 
98 Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 47; Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go 
First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 541, 555 (1992). 
99 Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 7. 
100 [d. at 99. 
101 See id. at 99-100. 
102 [d. 
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Individuals who have been exposed to asbestos also frequently 
contract asbestosis.103 Asbestosis, as the name suggests, is associated 
exclusively with asbestos.104 It is a chronic disease characterized by 
scarring of the lungs. Unlike pleural plaques, which do not affect lung 
capacity, asbestosis interferes with breathing and is insidious and 
progressive, often leading to heart failure. 105 However, as dust levels 
in factories have declined, the rate of severe asbestosis has declined.106 
Asbestosis usually occurs at least ten years after the initial exposure 
to asbestos.107 
Asbestos exposure also is associated with lung cancer and gastro-
intestinal cancer.108 Lung cancer is the most common cause of death 
among asbestos workers.109 Moreover, the combination of asbestos 
inhalation and cigarette smoke creates an increased risk of lung can-
cer sixty to ninety times greater than that of the unexposed.lIO 
The most deadly disease associated with asbestos exposure is meso-
thelioma, a rapidly progressing cancer that is almost inevitably fa-
tal.11l Mesothelioma is a cancer of the pleura, which is the tissue that 
encases the lungs.1I2 This devastating disease can occur in individuals 
with only a slight exposure to asbestos and does not occur until 
somewhere between twenty and fifty years after exposure to asbes-
tOS.1I3 Mesothelioma is associated almost exclusively with asbestos 
exposure-the incidence of mesothelioma among people with occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos is one to two orders of magnitude greater 
than the mesothelioma incidence rate of the general population.1I4 
B. Asbestos Cases and Increased Risk of Disease 
The history of asbestos and asbestos-related disease allows asbes-
tos plaintiffs to succeed where other toxic tort plaintiffs have failed.1I5 





108 BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 9. 
109 Id. 
l1°Id. at 10. 
111 Id. at 11. 
112Id. 
113 BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 10. 
114 Id.; Mustacchi, supra note 81, at 280-81 n.12. 
115 Compare Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 
478 U.S. 1022 (1986) and Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 
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The only two reported toxic tort cases in which the plaintiffs success-
fully have recovered damages for increased risk of disease both in-
volve occupational exposures to asbestos.1l6 
In Gideon v. Johns-Manville, the plaintiff worked as an insulation 
warehouseman from 1944 until 1969.117 At the time of trial Gideon had 
asbestosis.1l8 Although he did not have any form of cancer, Gideon 
claimed that he was likely to develop mesothelioma.1l9 During the 
trial, Gideon introduced evidence that he had a greater than fifty 
percent probability of developing cancer.120 The jury found for Gideon 
and awarded him approximately $500,000 in damages.121 
On appeal, the defendant contended that the court should have 
excluded evidence of Gideon's increased risk of cancer.122 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the admission of 
evidence of increased risk.123 The court found that because Gideon had 
a present injury-asbestosis-and had introduced expert testimony 
evidence that he was more likely than not to develop cancer, the jury 
could award him compensation for his increased risk.124 Because as-
bestos caused his injury, Gideon was able to satisfy the requirements 
of the increased risk of disease standard that the vast majority of 
toxic tort plaintiffs are unable to meet.125 
The other reported case where a plaintiff successfully collected 
damages for increased risk, Jackson v. Johns-Manville, involved facts 
similar to those in Gideon.126 The plaintiff Jackson inhaled asbestos 
while employed as a shipyard worker.127 When Jackson brought suit, 
he sought damages both for his present disease, asbestosis, and for 
his increased risk of developing cancer.128 At the time of the trial 
1985) with Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986) and Sterling 
v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988). 
116 Jackson, 781 F.2d at 396; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
117 Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 [d. at 1138. 
121 [d. at 1133. 
122 Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
128 [d. at 1138. 
124 [d. 
125 Compare Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137 with Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 
319 (5th Cir. 1986). 
126 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1134. 
127 Jackson, 781 F.2d at 369. 
128 [d. at 410. 
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Jackson did not have cancer, but he did have asbestosis.l29 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld his recovery of 
damages based on increased risk of disease.13o The court emphasized 
that the plaintiff had only one opportunity to recover for all of his 
damages because the principle of claim preclusion would prevent him 
from splitting his claimS.131 The court added that, regardless of whether 
Jackson could bring a second suit, Mississippi law clearly allowed 
recovery for probable future consequences.l32 Because Jackson could 
show that he had an injury and that his chance of getting cancer was 
greater than fifty percent, the court held that recovery for his in-
creased risk was appropriate.133 
Beyond the reported cases,l34 many plaintiffs with relatively mild 
injuries or without current injuries are not waiting to see if they 
develop more serious diseases, but are filing claims now for compen-
sation.l35 Data compiled from the Manville personal injury trust136 
reveals that, as injured workers have filed an increasing number of 
claims against the trust, claims by individuals with pleural plaques or 
with no present injuries have increased as a proportion of total claims.137 
Judges have noted a similar trend in claims filed in federal courts by 
plaintiffs seeking to avoid being barred by statutes of limitations.l38 
Some jurisdictions have responded to the large number of claims by 
plaintiffs whose only injuries are the presence of pleural plaques by 
129 [d. 
130 [d. at 413. 
131 [d. at 411. 
132 Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411. 
133 [d. at 413. 
134 In an unpublished decision, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
held that a plaintiff who had been exposed to asbestos could proceed with a claim for increased 
risk of disease. See Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 82-2686 (D.N.J. Dec. 11,1985). In 
that case, the court held that New Jersey law would allow the plaintiff to claim increased risk 
of disease damages although the plaintiff's expert testified that the plaintiff's risk of contracting 
cancer was 43%. [d. The court's conclusion that the reasonable probability test was satisfied by 
an increased risk of 43% is a dubious reading of New Jersey law. See Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 
561 A.2d 257, 266 (N.J. 1989). The District Court's liberal reading of the law may be explained 
partially by courts' more liberal attitudes towards asbestos plaintiffs. See infra notes 158-91 
and accompanying text. 
135 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 73. 
136 The Manville Corporation (the successor to Johns-Manville), the largest asbestos company 
in the United States, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in 1982. Under the reorganization, 
the company set up a trust to compensate victims of asbestos. See BRODEUR, supra note 95, at 
283-320. 
137 Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 73. 
138 [d. at 18-19 (statement of Rya Zobel, United States District Judge for the District of 
Massachusetts). 
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creating pleural registries. These pleural registries allow plaintiffs to 
record their claims before the statute of limitations expires, but defer 
those claims until the plaintiffs develop significant injuries.139 
The success of plaintiffs in asbestos cases stands in stark contrast 
to the failure of other toxic tort plaintiffs. Commentators have recog-
nized asbestos litigation as unique in the field of toxic torts, and in the 
history of litigation generally.l40 The unique nature of asbestos as a 
substance, combined with the peculiar history of asbestos litigation in 
this country, accounts for the unusual success of asbestos plaintiffs in 
recovering for increased risk of disease.141 The remainder of this Sec-
tion identifies the unique factors that have allowed asbestos plaintiffs 
to succeed in collecting damages for increased risk of disease. 
C. Magnitude of Increased Risk 
The uniqueness of asbestos-related diseases as compared with other 
diseases that plaintiffs may link to toxic exposures, has helped asbes-
tos plaintiffs successfully win recovery for increased risk of disease.142 
Unlike other toxic exposures, asbestos has a strong and widely rec-
ognized association with the lung diseases asbestosis and mesothe-
lioma, as well as other lung cancers.143 Moreover, the combination of 
asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking produces a synergistic ef-
fect that creates an extremely high chance of lung cancer.l44 
Asbestosis and mesothelioma differ significantly from other dis-
eases that may be caused by toxic exposures in that asbestos is their 
only known cause. This exclusive association strengthens the wide-
spread recognition of the link between asbestos and lung disease.l45 
Unlike other toxic tort plaintiffs, claimants with asbestosis or mesothe-
lioma do not face obstacles to proving causation.146 While many toxic 
exposures can cause diseases such as cancer, the diseases they cause 
occur frequently in the general population even without exposure to 
139 [d. at 12. 
140 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, AsBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 11 (1992); Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiter, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion 
Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 385 (1993). 
141 See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1985). 
142 See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 
478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
143 See BRODEUR, supra note 6, at 9-11. 
144 [d. at 9-10. 
145 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES 
§ 33.54, at 67-73 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA]. 
146 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
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a hazardous chemica}.147 In most of these cases, proving causation 
is impossible for plaintiffs because they cannot exclude intervening 
causes.l48 
Because the plaintiff in Gideon v. Johns-Manville was suffering 
from asbestosis he clearly had significant exposure to asbestos.149 
Gideon based his claim for increased risk of disease on the contention 
that he was likely to develop mesothelioma, another disease with an 
exclusive link to asbestos.15o Gideon's medical expert testified that 
there was a reasonable medical probability Gideon would die of an 
asbestos-related cancer.l5l The expert testimony satisfied the court 
that Gideon met the standard of reasonable medical probability and 
therefore should be permitted to recover damages for his increased 
risk of disease.l52 
In contrast, most plaintiffs in toxic tort cases that do not involve 
asbestos exposure are unable to meet the "more likely than not" 
threshold.l53 Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. provides an example 
of the problems that toxic tort plaintiffs face when claiming damages 
for increased risk of disease.l54 In Sterling, the defendant had disposed 
of 300,000 fifty-five gallon drums of ultrahazardous waste and hun-
dreds of fiber board cartons containing ultrahazardous dry chemical 
waste on a tract of rural land that the defendant had acquired to use 
as a landfill.155 As a result of the defendant's disposal practices, twelve 
to fifteen adjacent drinking water wells were contaminated with high 
levels of chlorinated hydrocarbons.l56 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that, although the defendant's 
conduct had exposed the plaintiffs to the contaminated water for a 
number of years and the district court found an increased risk of 
disease of twenty-five to thirty percent, this increased risk was not 
great enough to warrant recovery because it did not reach a reason-
able medical certainty.157 
147 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987). 
148 See id. 
149 See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
150 See id. at 1134. 
151 [d. at 1138. 
152 [d. 
158 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Hagerty v. L 
& L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F2d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1986); Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 
F. Supp. 424, 426 (D.S.C. 1987). 
154 Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205. 
155 [d. at 1192. 
156 [d. at 1193. 
157 See id. at 1205. 
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Thus, the difference in the magnitude of increased risk created by 
asbestos exposure compared with the increased risk associated with 
other toxic exposures can be outcome determinative in a claim for 
increased risk of disease. The uphill battle that all toxic tort plaintiffs 
face also is made easier for the asbestos plaintiff because courts are 
familiar with asbestos-related diseases. 
D. Judicial Familiarity 
Plaintiffs bringing claims for increased risk of disease due to asbes-
tos exposure have an easier time convincing courts of the relationship 
between their exposure and their increased risk of disease because 
courts are already familiar with asbestos-related diseases.l58 Because 
a judge hearing an asbestos case has most likely heard asbestos cases 
before and is familiar with the diseases caused by asbestos, he or she 
is apt to be less skeptical of plaintiffs' claims and therefore more 
lenient in allowing expert testimony and evidence of increased risk.159 
Plaintiffs have filed as many as 100,000 asbestos cases in federal and 
state courts throughout the country.l60 This unprecedented flood of 
litigation assures that most courts are quite familiar with asbestos.161 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphasized 
how familiar the court was with asbestos cases when it stated in 
Gideon: 
The history of litigation concerning asbestos-related diseases, the 
nature and cause of asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other lung 
diseases that may be caused by inhalation of asbestos fibers, ... 
have been discussed by us many times in the more than 25 cases 
in which we have considered such matters.l62 
William Schwarzer, a Senior United States District Judge, has char-
acterized the epidemiological and medical evidence relating asbestos 
to disease as "irrefutable."163 Because courts are comfortable with the 
idea that asbestos exposure causes serious illness, they are less skep-
tical of claims for increased risk of disease based on asbestos exposure.l64 
158 See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1985). 
159 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), em. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1135. 
160 Edley & Weiter, supra note 140, at 383. 
161 See Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1135 (5th Cir. 1985). 
162 Id. 
163 Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 122 (prepared statement of William W. 
Schwarzer). 
164 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.), em. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
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In contrast to courts' acceptance of the link between asbestos and 
increased risk of disease, courts seem to view claims of increased risk 
based on other hazardous exposures as implausible.l65 For instance, in 
Elam v. Alcola, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial 
court erred by allowing the plaintiffs' expert witness to testify that 
the plaintiffs had increased risk of cancer.lOO The Elam court rejected 
a doctor's testimony because he failed to quantify the increased risk 
faced by each of the plaintiffs.l67 In rejecting the expert's opinion, the 
court expressed suspicion of the doctor's testimony.l68 
In addition to reducing courts' skepticism towards plaintiffs seek-
ing to prove increased risk, judicial familiarity with asbestos cases 
also eases plaintiffs' task of showing the requisite physical injury.l69 
Asbestos plaintiffs easily satisfy the physical injury prerequisite to 
increased risk recovery because courts are willing to view changes in 
the plaintiffs' lungs caused by inhalation of asbestos as an injury.l7o In 
Gideon v. Johns-Manville, the court stated that Gideon's injury was 
the inhalation of fibers and the invasion of his body by those fibers, 
thus causing him physical damage.l7l The Gideon court did not express 
any reservation in characterizing the mere presence of asbestos in the 
plaintiff's lungs as an injury.l72 In contrast, plaintiffs exposed to other 
toxins often have difficulty convincing the court that their injuries are 
real. l73 Some courts have held that the mere presence of toxic chemi-
cals in a plaintiff's body is not a legally cognizable injury.174 
166 See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S. W.2d 42, 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 
(1989). 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. The court criticized the doctor's testimony because it hovered between certain 
cancer and risk of cancer. [d. The opinion quotes from the transcript at length which reveals 
that the doctor testified that the plaintiffs had a very high increased risk of cancer and that if 
they lived long enough, the plaintiffs eventually would develop the disease. [d. at 206-{}7. 
169 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985). 
170 See Jackson, 781 F.2d at 412; Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
171 Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137. 
172 [d. 
173 See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 42, 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 
(1989). 
174 See, e.g., McClenathan v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (W.D. W. Va. 1996); 
Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1400, 1410 (W.D. Mo. 1994). Although many courts 
do not consider mere exposure to a toxin an injury, some have recognized subcellular damage 
as an injury. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (D. Mass. 1986); 
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984). 
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Asbestos differs from other toxins in that asbestos fibers are large 
enough to be perceptible.175 Tangible asbestos fibers become embed-
ded in workers' lungs, causing changes that can be seen on x-ray.176 
The Gideon and Jackson opinions evince both an awareness of the 
physical process by which asbestos enters the lungs and becomes 
embedded in the tissue and a judicial willingness to recognize the 
presence of asbestos in a plaintiff's lungs as a physical injury.177 In 
contrast, other toxins typically cause imperceptible changes on a sub-
cellular level.I78 
The number of asbestos plaintiffs who already have recovered dam-
ages may have helped pave the way for plaintiffs currently seeking 
damages for increased risk of disease. Plaintiffs who bring claims for 
increased risk of disease based on exposure to asbestos do not have 
to establish the existence of a disease of which judges have never 
heard. The volume of asbestos litigation that has already passed through 
the courts also may contribute to the courts' proclivity to allow in-
creased risk of disease claims in asbestos cases because it is too late 
for the courts to prevent a flood of litigation. 
E. The Floodgates Are Already Open 
The reason for judicial familiarity-the number of suits already 
filed-is the same reason that hope of preventing a flood of litigation 
is forlorn. Most courts that refuse to allow toxic tort plaintiffs to 
proceed with increased risk claims cite the possibility that allowing 
an action for increased risk will precipitate a flood of dubious claims.179 
Apparently, those courts fear that an unlimited number of potential 
plaintiffs could file suit if increased risk of disease leads to recovery 
in one case.lSO In Ayers v. Jackson Township, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court was concerned that: 
A holding that recognizes a cause of action for unquantified en-
hanced risk claims exposes the tort system, and the public it 
serves, to the task of litigating vast numbers of claims for com-
pensation based on threats of injuries that may never occur.181 
175 CASTLEMAN, supra note 78, at 5. 
176 See id. 
177 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985). 
178 See, e.g., Brafford, 586 F. Supp. at 17. 
179 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 307 (N.J. 1987). 
180 [d. 
181 [d. 
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The fear of a flood of litigation is less of a factor in asbestos cases 
because the flood gates are already open.182 Asbestos litigation is 
highly unusual in that plaintiffs have been successful, a factor that 
undoubtedly contributed to the other remarkable characteristic of 
asbestos litigation-its great volume.l83 
Implicit in the decisions allowing compensation for increased risk 
of asbestos-related disease was a concern that the asbestos manufac-
turers' assets would be depleted quickly.l84 The plaintiffs may have 
never recovered damages if the courts had not allowed the plaintiffs 
to recover in their original suits, because the number of successful 
damage awards and the number of companies that have filed for 
bankruptcy have depleted the available pool for recovery.l85 
F. Limited Class of Asbestos Plaintiffs 
Although there have been a significant number of asbestos claims, 
the universe of asbestos plaintiffs is not limitless.186 Most claimants in 
asbestos cases received their asbestos exposure at work.187 Although 
many industries used asbestos for a variety of purposes, significant 
exposures are associated with occupational handling of asbestos.188 
In contrast, many other toxic exposures are caused by contamina-
tion of the soil and groundwater.189 These cases differ from asbestos 
cases in that the plaintiff class is much more indeterminate.l90 The 
number of people who have been exposed to diffuse chemical contami-
nants through the water supply or atmosphere is potentially limitless. 
This fact contributes to courts' reluctance to allow increased risk 
claims in most cases of toxic exposure.191 
182 See HENSLER, supra note 140, at 3. 
183 [d. 
184 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 n.21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
478 U.S. 1022 (1986). 
185 [d. 
186 Plaintiffs with occupational exposure to asbestos file the majority of asbestos cases. Of 
claims pending against the Johns-Manville Corporation at the time of bankruptcy 40% of the 
claimants were shipyard workers, eight percent were insulation workers, and seven percent 
were asbestos producers. HENSLER, supra note 140, at 12-13. 
187 See, e.g., Jackson, 781 F.2d at 369 (shipyard worker); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
761 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1985) (insulation warehouseman). 
188 See LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 145, § 33.54, at 67 (classifying asbestos-
related diseases as "occupational"). 
189 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986); Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 
291 (N.J. 1987). 
190 See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1192; Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1222; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 291. 
191 See, e.g., Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232; Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307. 
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Asbestos's unique history helps explain why asbestos plaintiffs have 
successfully recovered damages for increased risk of disease while 
other toxic tort plaintiffs have been unsuccessful. The following Sec-
tion suggests that that this outcome is undesirable because asbestos 
plaintiffs may be overcompensated and other toxic tort plaintiffs left 
undercompensated. Part B of the following Section proposes a pro-
portional recovery scheme as a solution to the inequity of the current 
standard. 
IV. OVERCOMPENSATION AND UNDERCOMPENSATION 
A. The Problem 
The fact that the only toxic tort plaintiffs successfully to recover 
damages for increased risk of disease were exposed to asbestos illus-
trates the shortcomings of the current legal standard permitting full 
recovery when the plaintiff can prove that his or her risk of disease 
is greater than fifty percent. In the majority of cases the current 
standard precludes plaintiffs from recovering when they are exposed 
involuntarily to dangerous substances because of another's negligent 
conduct.192 In Gideon v. Johns-Mansville and Jackson v. Johns-Man-
ville, the present standard allowed the plaintiffs, who did not cur-
rently have cancer, to recover damages as though they did.193 Allowing 
full recovery when a disease may not occur unnecessarily depletes the 
shrinking resources available to individuals actually injured by asbes-
tos exposure.l94 
The most serious problem with the present standard is that it views 
increased risk claims as present claims for future injury and ap-
proaches compensation as an all or nothing proposition.195 This ap-
proach allows plaintiffs with a fifty-one percent chance of developing 
cancer to recover as though they will definitely get the disease, while 
precluding plaintiffs with an increased susceptibility below the threshold 
level from recovering any thing. 196 
192 See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205; Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1232. 
193 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985). 
194 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 8. 
195 See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986); Pollack v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 491 (D.N.J. 1988); Mauro v. Raymark Indus., 561 
A.2d 257, 261 (N.J. 1989). 
196 Compare Jackson, 781 F.2d at 411 and Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137 with Pollock, 686 F. Supp. 
at 491 and Mauro, 561 A.2d at 261. 
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Most victims of toxic exposure cannot meet the "more likely than 
not" threshold because harmful environmental exposures are unlikely 
to create a greater than fifty percent chance of contracting a disease.197 
The fifty percent threshold means that plaintiffs will go uncompen-
sated even in cases where the defendant's behavior was clearly reck-
less and the plaintiffs face an increased risk of serious disease caused 
by the defendant's recklessness. 
The present state of the law does not fulfill one of the central goals 
of the tort system because it fails to provide a deterrent to the 
creation of excessive environmental risks. l98 Up to eighty percent of 
all cancers are caused by environmental factors and therefore poten-
tially are preventable.l99 Despite this fact, the present all or nothing 
approach to compensation does not provide enough incentive for users 
and manufactures of carcinogens to reduce the risks to others, be-
cause exposure to most substances creates an increased risk of less 
than fifty percent.200 
On the other hand, the current standard overcompensates plaintiffs 
who are able to establish an increased risk of greater than fifty per-
cent, because these plaintiffs recover damages as though they actually 
had the disease.201 This danger is particularly problematic in the as-
bestos context because so many plaintiffs are vying for a share of a 
limited and dwindling pool of available funds.202 
With fourteen former asbestos manufacturers already bankrupt, 
awarding full compensation to plaintiffs who may never develop the 
anticipated disease makes little sense.203 Awarding full damages to 
this class of plaintiffs is not only unfair to defendants, but such awards 
could quickly exhaust the available resources, leaving later plaintiffs 
with no chance of compensation.204 
197 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. 
W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986); Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 320. 
198 See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 850. 
199 Mary E. Constanza, et. ai., Cancer Prevention and Detection: Strategy for the Office 
Practice, in CANCER MANUAL (American Cancer Society Massachusetts Division, ed., 6th ed. 
1982). 
200 See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205; Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319; Kosrnacek v. Farm Service 
Co-op of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). 
201 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985). 
202 See Schuck, supra note 98, at 555. 
203 See id. 
204 See Asbestos Litigation Crisis, supra note 21, at 8. 
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B. Proportional Recovery Solution 
One viable alternative to the present standard would be to allow 
plaintiffs with substantially increased risk of disease to recover, but 
to make the recovery proportional based on the increment by which 
the exposure has increased their risk. This approach would provide a 
deterrent to negligent behavior that creates an increased risk of 
disease, but would avoid over-compensating plaintiffs as a class. 
Maintaining the requirement of a present injury while allowing 
proportional recovery to plaintiffs who have a significantly increased 
risk of disease that is less than fifty-one percent would prevent ille-
gitimate claims from being brought. Allowing claims for significantly 
increased risk of disease also would provide compensation to wrong-
fully exposed plaintiffs and create an incentive for users and produc-
ers of hazardous substances to handle them more carefully.205 The 
present injury requirement would weed out excessively speculative 
claims because only individuals who could prove that they had a 
tangible injury would recover. Making the recovery proportional also 
would discourage suits based on very low exposures or highly unlikely 
claims because the recovery for a slight increase in risk of disease 
would not provide a sufficient incentive to bring a suit. 
Allowing proportional recovery is preferable to the option many 
courts have adopted-permitting plaintiffs to split causes of action by 
bringing a second suit when and if a disease does develop.206 Plaintiffs 
in toxic tort cases face an uphill battle proving the elements necessary 
to prevail in court.207 The task is even greater for plaintiffs forced to 
wait decades before bringing a claim to court. Because most cancers 
caused by toxic exposures may have many potential contributing 
factors, plaintiffs probably will not be able to rule out the possibility 
of intervening causes if they bring a suit twenty years or more after 
exposure to the chemical.208 
The task of proving causation also is made more difficult by the fact 
that witnesses may not be available and evidence may be gone by the 
time the future action is undertaken.209 The passage of time creates 
205 See Legum, supra note 3, at 582-83. 
206 See Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 
P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
207 See Ayers, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (acknowledging that plaintiffs may not obtain compensation 
in future). 
208 See id. at 301. 
209 See Mauro v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 271 (N.J. 1989) (Handler, J., dissenting). 
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practical burdens for the judicial system as well as for plaintiffs.210 
Although courts reject claims for increased risk of disease out of a 
fear of a flood of litigation, allowing two suits instead of hearing all 
potential claims in one suit has a greater potential for increasing the 
burden on the legal system.2l1 
In addition to reducing burdens on the judicial system and litigants, 
allowing present compensation furthers the goal of deterrence.212 Al-
lowing plaintiffs to bring a prompt action when they have been wrong-
fully exposed to toxins is likely to provide an effective deterrent 
because the individuals in control of decisions about the handling of 
toxic chemicals when plaintiffs were exposed probably also will be in 
control when the case is decided.213 
Furthermore, despite the fact that courts decry increased risk dam-
ages as speculative, allowing proportional recovery for increased risk 
of disease is consistent with current tort rules which do not require 
damages to be easily quantifiable.214 Dissenting in Ayers v. Jackson 
Township, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Handler pointed out 
that difficulty in quantifying damages does not prevent courts from 
awarding compensation for assault, trespass, emotional distress, in-
vasion of privacy, or damage to reputation.215 Allowing compensation 
for increased risk of disease recognizes that involuntary exposure to 
toxic chemicals entails an invasion of individual autonomy as offensive 
as many traditionally recognized torts such as trespass, assault, and 
invasion of privacy.216 Most individuals would not expose themselves 
intentionally to toxic substances.217 Allowing recovery for increased 
risk recognizes that exposure to toxic chemicals is an injury that no 
one would subject themselves to willingly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current approach to increased risk of disease damages is ill-
suited to the problems presented by toxic tort cases. The all or noth-
210 See id. (Handler, J., dissenting). 
211 See id. at 270 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
212 See Legum, supra note 3, at 584. 
213 See id. at 585. 
214 See Mauro, 561 A.2d at 270 (Handler, J., dissenting). 
215 Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 318 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
216 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 319 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also E. 
Donald Elliot, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and 
Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781, 787--88 (1988). 
217 See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 320 (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("No person 
in her right mind would trade places with anyone of these plaintiffs."). 
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ing approach is unjust because it inevitably overcompensates or un-
dercompensates plaintiffs as a class. The disparate results achieved 
by asbestos plaintiffs highlights the inappropriateness of the current 
approach. 
The fact that asbestos victims are the only toxic tort plaintiffs to 
recover damages for increased risk of disease is ironic. While asbestos 
manufacturers were filing for bankruptcy, plaintiffs who did not cur-
rently have cancer were being compensated as though they had can-
cer.218 In other cases, plaintiffs who have been exposed involuntarily 
to hazardous substances are denied recovery.219 
Allowing plaintiffs in asbestos and other toxic tort cases to recover 
proportional damages for increased risk of disease would produce a 
more just result. This approach would reduce the amount of compen-
sation received by asbestos plaintiffs without cancer, while facilitating 
recovery for others who do not meet the fifty-one percent threshold. 
218 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 478 
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985). 
219 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. 
w.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986). 
